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to English homelessness services at the outset, and builds on earlier investigations which have 
uncovered how the use of illegitimate discretion can potentially lead to detrimental outcomes for 
service users affected by homelessness. This topic is particularly salient in light of the current 
politically austere climate, whereby statutory homelessness services have experienced an increase in 
service users, yet resources, if anything, are declining. Interview findings from twelve local 
authorities found evidence of unlawful discretion, which was attributed to a complex mesh of 
individual, intersubjective, organisational and central-led factors. However, the use of negative 
discretion was chiefly underpinned by higher level pressures around resource scarcity and strict 
targets. 
 
Keywords: Austerity, discretion, homelessness, policy implementation, street level 
bureaucrat. 
 
Introduction 
dŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ĚƌĂǁƐ ŽŶ DŝĐŚĂĞů >ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ƐƚƌĞĞƚ ůĞǀĞů ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚ  ?^> ŚĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌ ? 
conceptual framework to explore the exercise of (chiefly negative) discretion in English local 
authority housing advice services (LAHAS hereafter). It begins by summarising the current political 
climate in England, and is followed by an exploration of studies which have assessed frontline LAHAS 
delivery. It then outlines the SLB conceptual framework before exploring the findings based on 
interviews which were carried out in twelve LAHAS. Whilst statutory homelessness services in many 
developed countries are currently operating within an austerity driven environment (FEANTSA, 
2012), LAHAS in England are the focus due to the unique evolution of its homelessness law and the 
specific policy areas which have been created, or transformed, by the Coalition Government. In a 
similar vein, while England shares some similarities to homelessness services based in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, each have employed devolved powers to develop distinct systems 
which are not directly comparable (for example, in Scotland a priority need policy is no longer in 
operation).  
 
Where the impact of frontline discretion has been considered in previous studies, it has generally 
either dealt with a particular aspect of its application, or has not factored an implementation 
orientated perspective into the research frame. With respect to the former, commentators have 
linked divergent decision making to specific characteristics, such as gender (Cramer, 2005) and 
ethnicity (Halliday, 2000). Further, it has been found that presenting with more fluid or transient 
circumstances, for instance domestic violence (Rashleigh, 2005), leaving the parental home (Niner, 
1989), or specific health concerns (Bretherton et al., 2013), can negatively impact upon the 
assessment process. Commentators have also assessed internal review procedures (Cowan et al., 
2006) and the means by which the requirement to ration resources may interact with service 
outcomes (Lidstone, 1994). A few scholars have uncovered the use of negative discretion, but within 
an overall framework that is primarily interested in the experiences of homeless populations. One 
example of this is Bowpitt et al ? ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ LAHAS assessments were insufficiently 
conducted when researching multiple exclusion homelessness. The most prevalent explorations 
around the exercise of illegitimate discretion in LAHAS are those which centre on gatekeeping 
practices. However, much of the literature with an interest in this area tends to be descriptive in 
nature rather than theoretically focused. One possible reason for this is that a large volume of 
2 
 
research in this area has been commissioned by third sector organisations (Pannell and Palmer, 
2004), particularly Crisis (for example, Rashleigh, 2005; Brent Homeless Users Group, 2009; 
Cheeseman, 2011; Reeve and Batty, 2011), or Government departments (for example, Niner, 1989; 
Pawson et al., 2006; Pawson, 2007), who are perhaps more likely to expect an applied approach to 
understanding legal interpretation and service provision on the frontline. It should be reiterated 
here that although a number of the studies referred to abovĞ ŚĂǀĞ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ >ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ
framework, none applied it at the outset. This article adds to the literature around the use of 
potentially unlawful discretionary practices in English LAHAS by employing the SLB framework to 
assess what factors influence the likelihood of frontline practitioners applying it. It further provides 
an insight into how the current politically austere climate may impact on discretionary behaviour. In 
summary, it aims to answer the following broad questions: where frontline LAHAS decision makers 
apply negative discretion, what factors determine the form it might take? Is its exercise led by 
individual, organisational or central factors, or a mixture of each? 
 
An implementation perspective 
It is now generally accepted that the policy process is a messy affair (Lindblom, 1959), and to view 
central government as the primary determinant of policy outcomes from inception to 
implementation is flawed. Most scholars now agree that in respect of social policy issues, effective 
research must evaluate the aggregate influences manifest at the frontline (Evans, 2010). It is 
therefore argued that to comprehend the forces that drive LAHAS to interpret or act upon directives 
in a particular way it is necessary to investigate how that policy is delivered. As highlighted above, 
researchers who have undertaken investigations into the operation of LAHAS have tended to focus 
on the more negative elements of discretion as they relate to the use of gatekeeping. These studies 
have found divergent interpretations of housing law, resulting in a geographic inequity of outcomes 
for those who present to services as threatened with homelessness (Niner, 1989; Loveland, 1991; 
Burrows, 1997). Although it was found that discretion was not the sole reason for gatekeeping, as 
ambiguity around the meaning of the Housing Act also played a part (Niner, 1989; Rashleigh, 2005; 
Brent Homeless Users Group, 2009), it remained an important explanatory factor. It has been argued 
that the use of discretion to gatekeep is not necessarily an exercise of power on the part of 
employees, but rather a reaction to top-down pressures and policy ambiguity (Lipsky, 1980), 
underpinned by an overriding lack of resources (Niner, 1989; Evans, 1999: 138; Bowpitt et al., 2011). 
More specifically, pressure to meet organisational performance measures (Halliday, 2000; Rashleigh, 
2005) and heavy workloads (Evans, 1999) were identified as the main contributory causes. Overall, 
the literature placed a heavy emphasis on middle or macro level forces and suggested that individual 
autonomy exerted little, if any, influence. 
 
The street level bureaucrat 
>ŝƉƐŬǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƐƚƌĞĞƚůĞǀĞůďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚŽƐĞĂƚƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ level who 
exercised discretion by manipulating interpretation of law in the course of their day-to-day role 
(Lipsky, 1980: 4). This was generally regarded in a negative light as practitioners were required to re-
shape legal directives in response to higher level (chiefly resource led) pressures and to deal with an 
inherent contradiction that the purpose of their role was to assist all service users, yet being 
furnished with insufficient tools to do so (Lipsky, 1980). It was thus maintained that frontline 
decision makers were at times required to apply discretion in a flawed or discriminatory fashion to 
effectively undertake the role (Lipsky, 1971: 393 W5). The ability to reshape policy intentions, 
deliberately or otherwise, was viewed as being further assisted by the ambiguous nature of legal 
directives (Lipsky, 1980). Although formed within an American context, Lipsky (1980) believed that 
his framework was applicable to any public service organisation that had extensive face to-face 
contact with the public and exercised discretion (Lipsky, 2010: xvii). Of particular interest to this 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐ>ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵŶĞǀĞŶĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ available resources led to 
unequal service outcomes (Lipsky, 1980: pxi). LAHAS were assessed as representing a good fit due to 
a combination of their statutory function, tight budget, discretionary element in service delivery, and 
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ƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ  ‘ƐƚŝŐŵĂƚŝƐĞĚ ? service, which Lipsky (1980) believed would be especially prone to 
SLB type behaviours. 
 
Although Lipsky (1971) conceived of his framework over forty years ago, and American public 
services were the focus of enquiry, his unique conceptualisation of a SLB has been widely utilised by 
commentators interested in statutory policy implementation. Furthermore, while UK investigations 
have been heavily concentrated in social work departments (Baldwin, 2000; Ellis, 2007; Sullivan, 
2009), it has been effectively applied to Jobcentre Plus offices (Fletcher, 2011) and nursing staff 
(Hoyle, 2014). For the most part, these studies have viewed the application of discretion in negative 
terms, linking it to detrimental outcomes for particular service users. A small number of scholars 
have argued that the SLB framework is no longer valid due to managerialist developments and an 
associated drive to scrutinise the public sector (Howe, 1991; Taylor and Kelly, 2006). But it has been 
countered that although enhanced scrutiny may stem flagrant abuse of policy, it does not erode the 
undercurrent of discretion that is embedded in statutory organisations (Hudson, 1989:49). Lipsky 
(2010) has revisited his original work in recent years, concluding that while changes such as 
managerialism had restructured local government, the organisational pressures that cause policy 
intentions to be reshaped persisted. What tends to be more common is that researchers concur with 
the principle factors that make up the SLB, but modify elements to reflect specific research findings, 
or contemporary developments (see below). Understanding the potential motivational factors which 
may lead to unlawful discretionary practices is complex due to the array of potential influences that 
can impact upon frontline ruminations. However, most SLB commentators argue that it is chiefly 
attributable to central or organisational led causations. It has been suggested that even when 
discretionary decisions are based on specific values held by individuals, this may have been formed 
within the organisation for which they are employed (Taylor and Kelly, 2006: 631). For the purposes 
of this article, an exploration of the potential determinants of negative discretionary practices 
considers how assessments formed by individual officers interact with supervisory, organisational 
and central level influents. 
 
Relationship between central, organisational and individual values 
As highlighted above, Lipsky (1980) found that higher level pressures due to supervisory (see below), 
organisational and central aims generally took precedence over individual or service level concerns 
where discretion is applied by SLBs, hence its negative application; yet this prerogative focus has 
been disputed by some commentators. Durose (2011) argued that newer, more decentralised 
elements of service provision meant that practitioners were no longer unilaterally controlled by 
bureaucratic concerns. Subsequently, far from merely ensuring organisational goals are achieved, 
they juggled central directives and worked ƚŽǁĂƌĚ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ  ‘Ĩŝƚ ? with local needs. Maynard-
Moody and Musheno (2000) similarly ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ^>ƐǁŽƵůĚďĞďĞƚƚĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚĂƐ  ‘ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ
ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ? ĂƐ ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ? ŝŶ ĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ĚƌĂǁ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů
objectives were viewed by ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƐƚƵĚǇĂƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ? Yet most 
ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ >ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĞ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ discretionary practices, as 
highlighted above. Further, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000: 340) themselves contended that 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞŽĨ  ‘ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ĂŐĞŶƚ ? ƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ reserved for a minority of service users, in particular 
ƚŚŽƐĞ ǀŝĞǁĞĚ ĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞ ? or  ‘ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝǀĞ ? ƚŽ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? &ŽƐƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĨĂƌ ĨƌŽŵ
service users benefiting from discretion, inequality of outcomes were embedded in its practice. 
Heywood et al. (2002) further questioned whether the action of frontline staff should even be 
viewed as discretion due to a view that policy outcomes were manipulated by frontline staff as a 
result of vertical dictation. These latter arguments imply that practitioners operate under the 
hegemonic control of a bureaucratic machine and that the term professional discretion may be an 
overstatement of frontline implementation behaviour; this discussion is returned to below. 
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Supervisory influence 
Lipsky (1980) held the assumption that supervisory staff wished to suppress SLB practices whilst 
suggesting that frontline administration remained relatively unregulated. Yet recent research in UK 
public service settings suggests that Lipsky may have oversimplified the dynamics that exist between 
staff and supervisor. For example, it has been shown that senior staff can have conflicting goals 
themselves, and may be torn between upper and lower level concerns (Evans, 2011; Hoyle, 2014). 
Referring specifically to social workers, Evans (2011: 371) argued that Lipsky overemphasised a 
managerial desire to secure hegemony over staff and that insufficient regard was paid to 
supervisors, who may exhibit SLB behaviours where they viewed it as necessary. A related argument 
is that if employers are advised to make fiscal savings, this may influence the decision of supervisors 
to turn a blind eye to policy contravention if it resulted in meeting set objectives (Evans and 
Harris,2004: 873; Evans, 2010), which, as highlighted above, is a particularly salient issue within 
LAHAS in the current austere political climate. The argument that managers may tacitly approve SLB 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ŝŶ ŵĂŶǇ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ ƌƵŶƐ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ƚŽ >ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ and is considered 
further below. 
 
Research methods 
The project took a two stage approach, whereby a baseline survey was forwarded to all LAHAS in 
England prior to the qualitative interviews being carried out. The survey was emailed to senior 
officers in December 2012 and was analysed with the assistance of SPSS in March 2013. It provided a 
broad overview of current service provision in English LAHAS and assisted in identifying 
determinants within LAHAS which were utilised for the purposes of selecting authorities for follow 
up interviews. A total of 272 practitioners completed the survey, representing over two thirds of 
authorities; it was felt that the high response rate helped to ensure a comprehensive representation 
was achieved. Although the survey results are only referred to briefly in this article, it is covered here 
as the responses informed the question guide for the follow up interviews. Based on the results of 
the baseline survey it was ensured that the LAHAS approached for interviewing had a mixture of 
sizes, geographical location type and other variables which were found to represent differences in 
how a given LAHAS may operate a service, Table 1 provides further details around these specific 
factors. Eighteen LAHAS based in Northern England were initially selected: details regarding the 
manager of each department were gathered and each contacted via email to invite both the 
recipient and staff members to participate in an interview. A total of twenty-seven employees in 
twelve LAHAS were interviewed between April and July 2013; one third consisted of line managers, 
and the remainder were frontline practitioners. To protect the identity of the LAHAS, the type of 
authority (i.e. metropolitan, unitary, etc.) has not been added to the table below, but it included one 
unitary authority, one district, two metropolitan districts, four boroughs and four metropolitan 
boroughs. 
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Table 1 Profile of Local Authorities 
 
LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
A B C D E F G H I J K L 
Size1 XL L M M M S M S M L M M 
Geographic area2 URB MIX MIX MIX URB RUR URB MIX MIX URB URB URB 
Statutory 
homelessness 
decision maker3 
MAN OFF MAN OFF BTH OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF 
Availability of 
private rented 
housing4 
 
PFO SCE SCE PALL PFO SCE SCE SCE PALL SCE DOA PFO 
Availability of 
social housing4 
SCE SCE SCE PFO SCE SCE SCE SCE PALL PFO PFO PFO 
Homelessness 
acceptances5 
URE INC RED SME INC SME SME SME INC INC SME INC 
Homelessness  
Preventions5 
INC INC INC INC INC INC INC INC SME INC INC INC 
*Notes 
1 extra large (XL), large (L), medium (M), small (S) 
2 urban (URB), rural (RUR), mixed (MIX) 
3 manager (MAN), officer (OFF), both (BTH)  
4 scarce (SCE), plentiful all (PALL), plentiful families only (PFO), depends on area (DOA)  
5 increased (INC), reduced (RED), same (SME), unsure (URE) 
 
Very large and rural LAHAS were slightly underrepresented based on the survey mix, whereas small, 
medium and large authorities alongside urban and rural LAHAS broadly reflected the survey 
demographics. The majority of employees were interviewed in two of the authorities, to gather 
information on how views and practices may differ endogenously. In the remaining LAHAS, between 
one and four practitioners were interviewed in each. The interviews were semi structured and 
guided by broad topics relating to housing policy implementation and service delivery in the current 
political climate. The main themes were inforŵĞĚďǇ>ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŵŽĚĞů ?ƐƵƌǀĞǇĚĂƚĂ
and the literature review, and covered resource levels, organisational targets, evidence of rationing 
or related gatekeeping behaviours, training and interpretation of housing law. The interviews were 
transcribed and analysed by the researcher with the assistance of NVIVO software. Although codes 
were created as the interview data were input into NVIVO, the initial interview themes were chiefly 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ďǇ >ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ^> ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƐ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ƚŚĞ codes were strongly influenced by the 
factors present within the framework. This was not a concern as the SLB model was consciously 
adopted at the outset, and utilising its main variables did not preclude the researcher from 
identifying potential challenges to the framework, which are considered below. 
 
Findings 
 
Central and organisational factors 
Nearly all interviewees suggested a detachment from the central context of the policy they delivered 
and many, including managers, appeared to view themselves within a linear top down reality with 
little opportunity to influence outcomes. Many expressed what could perhaps be described as a 
fatalist outlook; policy happened to them, and there was nothing they could do to prevent 
whichever trajectory the Government chose to pursue: 
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Top-down, and I think that aint going to change...on the team level, we can make suggestions 
ƚŚĂƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĨŽƌŽƵƌƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚĞĂŵ ?ŝƚŝƐŶ ?ƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚ
ũƵƐƚŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ^ŝǆ ?>,K^) 
 
A number of interviewees, both senior and frontline, viewed the protection of resources as an 
important factor when assessing households affected by homelessness with a few acknowledging 
that service users could expect differing treatment due to limited time and budget. This pressure 
was generally assessed as being less in response to intense scrutiny and more attributable to general 
targets and political objectives. For example one manager advised that although policy makers do 
not get closely involved in micro level delivery, there is little freedom to adapt the role due to 
pressure around keeping statutory homeless acceptance levels low: 
 
/ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞƐƚĂĨĨŚĂĚƐŽŵĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬǁĞĚŽ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŝƐ
top line that need to acknowledge the work and I am not convinced that that is always the 
ĐĂƐĞ ? / ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ŚĂƉƉǇ ĂƐ ůŽŶŐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚ ƚŽŽ ŚŝŐŚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ
particularly bad happening (Manager, LAHOS K) 
 
In line with the findings discussed in the introductory sections many interviewees had either 
witnessed or practiced gatekeeping in response to higher level pressures, due mainly to a lack of 
resources and a target driven environment: 
 
ůůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŐĂƚĞŬĞĞƉ ?ĂŶĚŝĨƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŽůĚǇŽƵƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚthey are lying to you, they have to 
because of the shortage of resources (Officer One, LAHOS J) 
 
zŽƵ ĂƌĞ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŶŽƚ ůĞƚ ƚŚĞŵ ŵĂŬĞ Ă ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ǁĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ
temporary accommodation...I have got into a situation where I am turning around and saying 
to people, your priority need, you fit the criteria, go away, I have got nothing for you (Manager, 
LAHAS B) 
 
Pressure to exercise negative discretion was exacerbated in authorities with scarcer housing options, 
which is in line with previous findings (Niner, 1989; Bowpitt et al, 2011). For example one 
practitioner stated that availability of suitable accommodation had a significant impact on how a 
given LAHAS interpreted and applied the Housing Act: 
 
We apply intentionality very very rarely, and I think your stock almost dictates how you use the 
ĂĐƚ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŚĞƌĞ ?ĂƐǁĞĂƌĞůƵĐŬǇ ?ĂƐǁĞĚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚ ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐƐƚŽĐŬƚŽĐŽǀĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐ
(Officer Two, LAHAS I) 
 
Further, authorities with scarcer accommodation resources were more likely to encourage 
practitioners to exercise negative discretion in comparison to the (albeit few) where some types of 
accommodation were more plentiful. A good illustration of this can be seen in the conflicting 
instructions given by two managers in respect of how staff should assess if their respective authority 
had a statutory duty toward a household. Where accommodation was assessed as plentiful the 
manager advised that she encouraged staff to look for reasons to accept a person: 
 
When you take a homeless application you are very thorough, and you look for a priority rather 
ƚŚĂŶƐĂǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚŽŶĞ ? ? ?/ũƵƐƚŚŽƉĞƐƚĂĨĨĂƌĞƉƌŽĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚƐŽƌƚŽĨ ?ŚŽǁĐĂŶ/ƉƵƚŝƚ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞ
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚůŽŽŬĨŽƌƚŚĞŶŽ ?ƐůŽŽŬĨŽƌƚŚĞǇĞƐ ?Ɛ ?DĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?>,^/ ? 
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In contrast a manager employed in an authority with scarce accommodation resources urged staff to 
look for reasons not to accept an applicant in an attempt to protect resources: 
 
We have to be quite harsh in our decision making process because, as I say, we have got very 
limited accommodation (Manager, LAHAS C) 
 
These quotes draw attention to the ways in which supervisory staff may attempt to influence the 
ways in which practitioners make decisions due to the pressure to meet organisational goals and is 
now considered in further detail.  
 
Supervisory influence  
Maynard-DŽŽĚǇ ĂŶĚ DƵƐŚĞŶŽ  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŵŽƌĞ
influential than that of a senior officer, but it was found that this depended on the style of 
supervision, and what role management played in the day to day running of the service. Some senior 
officers were able to significantly alter the culture of the authority managed and this appeared to 
have a marked impact on individual decision making. Further, this influence was not limited to 
statutory homelessness decision making as officers who made their own assessments could still be 
influenced by supervisory pressures. For example some managers vetted households who required 
temporary accommodation, or practitioners in some cases were compelled to reduce statutory 
acceptances or use of temporary accommodation. Some officers advised that they were pressurised 
by senior officers to send priority need households away or unlawfully refuse to provide temporary 
accommodation. A few explicitly accused a supervisor of encouraging gatekeeping, for example 
when discussing a former manager one practitioner stated that: 
 
The manager at the time was a gatekeeper and changed the rules to fit her understanding of 
what the service can be, the law was manipulated to fit the service she wanted to provide, I 
think that is the best way I can put it (Officer One, LAHAS C) 
 
Another officer reported that a previous line manager had encouraged staff to pretend to take a 
homeless application disguised as an advice case if a service user asserted a legal right to make a 
statutory presentation. In one particular instance, this led to a service user who was deemed to 
ŵĞĞƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ĨŽƌ ŵĞŶƚĂů ŚĞĂůƚŚ ďĞŝŶŐ ƐĞŶƚ ĂǁĂǇ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
cheĐŬƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵĂĚĞ P 
 
The manager at the time, well, she was very adverse to us taking homeless applications and we 
ǁŽƵůĚĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂǀĞƚŽƌƵŶŝƚƉĂƐƚŚĞƌŝĨǁĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŚĞǁŽƵůĚďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇƐĂǇ ?ŶŽ ?ƚĞůů
ƚŚĞŵƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚŚŽŵĞůĞƐƐ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ?KĨĨicer Three, LAHAS B) 
 
Although there were numerous examples of decision making which had been influenced by senior 
staff, practitioners did not necessarily adhere to these pressures. For example one officer advised 
that management were pressing staff to make quicker decisions on intentionality in an attempt to 
prevent the need for temporary accommodation pending enquiries, but he refused to allow this to 
impact upon his assessments: 
 
We have had recent instructions to try and get intentionality decisions done before we place 
someone [in temporary accommodation]...that is probably pressure on management filtering 
ĚŽǁŶĂŐĂŝŶ ? ? ?/ƚ ?ƐŬŝŶĚŽĨĐƵƚƚŝŶŐĐŽƌŶĞƌƐ ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ^ŝǆ ?>,^ ? 
 
 
Most of the examples above demonstrate that if a manager chooses to be more directly involved 
ǁŝƚŚ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? Žƌ ĂƉƉůŝĞƐ  ‘ĐůŽƐĞ ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?  ?WƌŽƚƚĂƐ ?  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ůĞƐƐ
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flexibility in terms of applying autonomy to their own decisions. In this sense and based on the 
suggestion by some interviewees that managers may encourage contravention of housing law to 
meet set goals, this fits with Evans (2010) findings that supervisors exhibit SLB behaviours if the 
conditions require it. These pressures that bear directly on management may be further exacerbated 
in the few cases where practitioners suggested that they were either not aware of, or did not 
concern themselves with central objectives: 
 
Yeah there are lots of targets and quotas, management deal with most of that side of things 
but we have to log em, we have got, targets for prevention, we have to log all our prevention 
cases, and they are looked at annually and reports are sent back to council members, we have 
targets within homelessness, statutory targets for when decisions should be made and things 
like that (Officer Four, LAHAS B) 
 
This suggests that in certain circumstances senior staff may shoulder the burden of central 
directives. However, the officer quoted above still felt pressured due to the lack of temporary 
accommodation for households that required emergency housing. 
 
Individual values 
Although tangible factors, such as meeting organisational goals were important determinants of 
decision making, personal judgement proved to be a crucial area in which homelessness 
assessments may differ. Most interviewees agreed that although the Housing Act itself was broad 
and ambiguous, divergent decision making could not be reduced to organisational led 
interpretations of the Act, but rather, must be understood in the context of a given decision makers 
own worldview, life experiences and values: 
 
I think sometimes it depends on background, I am from a psychology mental health 
background so when you see people coming through with depression maybe I am more 
ŚĂƌĚůŝŶĞ ?ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚŝƐƐĞǀĞƌĞĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐe I have seen the other end of the 
spectrum (Officer Six, LAHAS B) 
 
/Ŷ Ă ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ǀĞŝŶ ƚŽ ZĂƐŚůĞŝŐŚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? ũƵƐƚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŚĂůĨ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?Žƌ ‘ƐŽĨƚ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚŽĨƚĞŶĚĞĨŝ ĞĚŽƚŚĞƌŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĚichotomous 
manner. It was suggested that factors which contributed toward the type of decision maker you 
fitted into was not just developed through the role, but also as a result of individual attitudes which 
existed independently of it: 
 
I think people just come to the job with slightly different approaches, so people feel that they 
are gatekeepers and they are they are there to stop people from going through temporary 
accommodation no matter what it takes, and those are the hardliners as I call them, and then I 
think there are people who see themselves as more there to help people (Officer Four, LAHAS B) 
 
This officer viewed that subsequent behaviours and decision making would then be determined, at 
least in part, by this split. A few managers and practiƚŝŽŶĞƌƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐŽĨƚ ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŽƌĞ
likely to apply priority need, whereby those with a harder approach would expect a far higher 
threshold to be met:  
 
Very often I think if someone is coming in here and they are saying they are homeless there is 
something wrong, there is some vulnerability there, there can be quite a difference of opinion 
ƌĞĂůůǇ ?ŽŶŚŽǁǁĞĂƉƉůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ? /ƚ ?ƐĂǀĂůƵĞ ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚǀĞƌǇŽĨƚĞŶǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ? ůŝŬĞ ŝƐĂĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌ
vulnerable? We [referring to self and colleague] might say yes, but a lot of the staff would say 
 ?ŶŽ ?ŶŽ ? ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌdǁŽ ?>,^/ ? 
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One practitioner recalled an incident where her colleague had turned away a service user who had 
fled domestic violence, advising her to return home and fight for the joint tenancy. When the same 
person approached the authority a few months later and saw a different officer, emergency 
accommodation was provided immediately. The interviewee argued that the original officer was 
incorrect to initially send the service user away: 
 
When I came out of that interview, there is no way that I think that women is lying, I believed 
she was genuinely genuinely fearful of going back...when I came out the worker went to me, 
ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ƐŚĞ ŬŝŶĚ ŽĨ ƐĂŝĚ  ?ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ŚĂƐ ƐŚĞ ďĞĞŶ ůǇŝŶŐ ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ĂŶĚ / ũƵƐƚ ƚŚŽught, I just 
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŚĞǁĂƐůǇŝŶŐ ?/ũƵƐƚŬŝŶĚŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŵŵŵŵŵ ? ? ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁŚŽǁŵƵĐŚ
of the story she got ... but I do think she got quite a lot looking at the notes. But, then again, I 
am more experienced than her (Officer One, LAHAS B) 
 
dŚĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚůĂĐŬŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĐĂƵƐĞĚ ‘ŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐǁĂƐƚŚƌĞĂĚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ
the interview findings. Another practitioner advised that due to his softer approach, he would work 
harder to use discretion to positively assist a household, where his colleagues would be unlikely to 
so. In this particular example he moved a family who were receiving police protection due to 
harassment: 
 
One person might be a bit more generous, whereas another person might say, no, the rules say 
ƚŚĂƚ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ũƵst like, just before I came into this room I had to award a priority on welfare 
grounds..., I mean, another person might have said, no, the property is being target hardened, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĞŶŽƵŐŚŝƐďĞŝŶŐĚŽŶĞďǇƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ?ƐŽŝƚ ?ƐŬŝŶĚŽĨ ?ǇŽƵƐĞĞƚŚĂƚĐonflict there, it 
can go either way,  I would describe myself as more softer in approach to the rules... but 
because I know the geographical layout of the area because I am from [the local area], yeah, 
ŝƚ ?ƐĂďŝƚŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ?KĨĨŝĐĞƌ&ŽƵƌ ?>,S I) 
 
 The above examples aptly demonstrate how characteristics unique to the individual decision maker 
have the potential to determine the outcome of particular cases. However, this must be considered 
alongside the aforementioned limits imposed by frontline supervision and the overarching pressures 
which may cause gatekeeping behaviours to occur in the first place.  
 
 
Discussion 
It was found that, in respect of executing the Housing Act, LAHAS as organisations technically had 
the freedom to interpret law as they saw fit, but a significant caveat was the requirement to meet 
conditions, centrally set, to reduce statutory homelessness and use of emergency accommodation. 
The use of negative discretion could be attributed to a complex mesh of individual, organisational 
and central level concerns. But it appeared that even where individual values impinged on the 
process, many were led by organisational and, by extension, macro level priorities. For example, 
hardline decision makers were often motivated by the desire to protect resources, rather than 
applying strict criteria for their own sake. Examples of positive discrimination were few and far 
between, and focused on specific types of individual rather than the community of homelessness 
applicants as a whole. It ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚĞƌŵƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ĐŝǀŝĐ ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌ ?  ?ƵƌŽƐĞ ?
 ? ? ? ? ? Žƌ  ‘ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ĂŐĞŶƚ ?  ?DĂǇŶĂƌĚ-Moody and Musheno, 2000) did not adequately reflect the 
exercise of discretion in LAHAS. Rather, the nature of policy dissemination tended to emulate those 
of social service departments (Ellis, 2007; Sullivan, 2009; Evans, 2010). This is likely to be a 
consequence of unique research contexts, reflecting the diversity between street level bureaucracies 
and the SLBs employed within them. This is not to say that community orientated or altruistic 
intentions do not exist in LAHAS, but, rather, that for the most part this appeared secondary to 
organisational objectives. Of more concern was evidence that the negative application of discretion 
due to these pressures led to unlawful gatekeeping. The interviews supported the claim that 
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gatekeeping in LAHAS was not an exercise of power on the part of a given employee, but rather a 
reaction to top-down pressures (Loveland, 1991; Rashleigh, 2005). It was moreover identified, in line 
with Evans (2011), that although the SLB framework provided a useful tool to understand the 
application of discretion, the relationship between supervisory and frontline staff is more complex 
than that presented by Lipsky. 
 
The findings paint a picture of LAHAS dealing with limited resources in a highly pressurised 
environment, but it must be noted here that many officers valued face-to-face contact with the 
public, and that a few gave examples of when they had applied discretion to help certain service 
users. However, in the majority of cases practitioners were unable to provide an ideal service for 
many who required it, particularly in respect of households assessed as having no priority need. In 
summary, if a household seeks help they may be unwittingly entering a bureaucratic lottery, 
whereby the type of decision maker they see, a local scarcity of accommodation options, or the 
priorities of a given senior officer within an organisation may dramatically affect the outcome. 
 
Conclusion 
dŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ >ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ĞǆŚŝďŝƚ SLB type 
behaviour due to wider level role pressures. Lipsky (1980: 159) argued that preventing discretionary 
practices that may lead to misappropriation of the law was unachievable in street level 
bureaucracies, though he did feel that it could be potentially reduced. He suggested that 
management had a role to play in respect of containing the use of negative discretion by frontline 
officers, and this view remained evident in his updated work where he considered the strategies 
supervisory staff might attempt in order to limit SLB type behaviours (Lipsky, 2010). Yet, as 
highlighted above, this research indicated that the relationship between line managers and staff is 
more complex than that depicted by Lipsky. A further issue is that the interview findings supported 
ǀĂŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ that supervisors may also exhibit SLB type behaviours. This was due to the 
fact that they were subject to central pressures relating to lean budgets and targets to an even 
greater extent than staff members in many cases. 
 
Discretion on the Frontline 
Another suggestion was to ensure decisions were made on a team basis, whereby individual officers 
would no longer work in isolation or make assessments independently, thus lessening pressures 
around accountability (Lipsky, 1980: 208 W11). Yet it is contended that as professionals LAHAS 
practitioners are best placed to make legal homelessness assessments; although an important 
caveat is that they must be furnished with the appropriate tools to do so. Ultimately, a significant 
financial injection and change of central role focus would be required to make this become reality, 
particularly as findings suggest that both staff and supervisors are motivated by the need to protect 
limited resources. Alongside this, central government should acknowledge that housing law is being 
misapplied as a direct result of pressure to reduce homeless acceptances. Yet it was the escalation of 
statutory homelessness figures which caused the Labour Government over a decade ago to 
introduce stringent targets to reduce it in the first place. Related to this, there is a concern that 
policy makers provide tacit approval of gatekeeping as it ensures the main political agenda, at least 
on the surface, has a measure of success. It may therefore be that the illegitimate use of discretion 
in the form of gatekeeping is likely to worsen as the current austere political climate fosters an even 
tighter rationing environment. 
 
 
This article has added to the literature around frontline implementation in LAHAS by applying 
>ŝƉƐŬǇ ?Ɛ ^> ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ƚŽ ĂƐƐĞƐƐ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ have been 
significantly tightened alongside greater pressures due to an increase in service users. It has shown 
the importance of recognising that, although higher level pressures may lead to negative discretion, 
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the impact of individual actions should not be underestimated. On a final note, due to space 
limitations this article was unable to discuss how stereotypical frames of reference and bias impinge 
upon decision making, although both were found to be important contributing factors to the 
exercise of negative discretion. 
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